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Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience and Religion
in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts
Leszek Lech Garlicki ∗
This article1 attempts to summarize national reports on various
aspects of religious freedom. Following a brief introduction in Part I,
Part II outlines the approaches of constitutions and constitutional
jurisprudence to determine relations between church and state. Part
III addresses the ways of understanding the principle of freedom of
religion, followed by Part IV which presents various principles of
equality in reference to the position of churches and religious
groups. Part V outlines the forms of cooperation between church
and state, focusing in particular on education and religion teaching.
This article is based on information and reports concerning the
case law of constitutional courts in several European countries, including Austria, Belgium, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, the
Federal German Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, Liechtenstein,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovenia,
Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey.
I. INTRODUCTION
A discussion of freedom of religion requires consideration of relations between churches and the state. Modern Christian societies
now generally accept various versions of separation of church and
state (mutual autonomy), acknowledging a distinction of domains
belonging to each of them. But it is worthwhile to emphasize that, as
indicated by Samuel Krislov,2 separation of church and state is mostly
∗ Professor Garlicki completed the Faculty of Law and Administration at the University of Warsaw in 1968. He has lectured at dozens of universities in Poland, France, Germany,
and the United States. He is currently a judge on the Constitutional Tribunal of Poland.
1. This presentation is based on the author’s General Report, which was delivered at
the twenty-first Conference of Constitutional Courts of Europe (Warsaw, May 16–20, 1999).
See CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE IN THE AREA OF FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND
BELIEFS: XI CONFERENCE OF EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS (Leszek Lech Garlicki
ed., 2000) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE].
2. Samuel Krislov, Alternatives to Separation of Church and State in Countries Outside
the United States, in RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO PFEFFER 421, 423
(James E. Wood ed., 1985).
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found in the doctrine of Western civilization and the great religions
of the world adopt various concepts of church-state relations. Judaism was originally linked with the state, and only historical events
caused the eventual separation. The rebirth of the State of Israel allowed a return to tradition, and today an interesting symbiosis of religion and state is observed. Christianity originated as a religion separated from its antagonist, the state. Later links developed between
Christian churches and various nations, which were understood differently under Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant traditions. By
contrast, Islam, from its very origins, has been aligned with the state;
in this tradition, the identity of religion and government has always
been one of Islam’s fundamental features.3
From the European perspective, the Christian tradition is of fundamental significance.4 Therefore, most European constitutions and
jurisprudence assume a predominantly Christian audience since other
religions have always been in the minority.
Even assuming this largely Christian audience, individual European nations have adopted vastly different schemes, which flow from
their different histories and traditions. Consequently, along with traditionally Protestant states (e.g., Great Britain and the Scandinavian
countries) and traditionally Catholic states (e.g., Austria, France,
Spain, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Slovenia, Poland, Portugal, and Italy),
there are European countries of mixed religious structure (e.g.,
Germany and Switzerland).5 Historically speaking, almost all countries formerly had a state church, and the political elite were more interested in establishing and maintaining religious peace than ensuring religious equality. In countries where historical development
focused on evolution rather than revolution, there may still be found
a very close linkage between a dominant religion and the state,
namely Scandinavian countries and the Anglican Church in England.
However, in a majority of Continental countries, the official relationship between church and state eventually broke down. This separation of church and state is not meant to result in a lack of assistance
or cooperation by the state to churches and does not foreclose the

3. See id.
4. Turkey is the only European country today where the Christian religion (or at least
tradition) does not dominate.
5. The experience of United States of America is undoubtedly a significant inspiration
for this version of church-state relations.
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existence of some churches remaining closer to the state than other
religious organizations or groups.6
It is a self-evident truth that religious freedom—both for an individual and for an institution—should be considered as a primary
element of the more general principle of freedom based on pluralism
and the protection of the minority. On the other hand, the churchstate relations define the approach and scope of individual religious
freedoms to a certain extent. Both extreme solutions—a religious
state (understood as a single-religion state) and an atheistic state
(understood as an anti-religious state)—are very dangerous for the
freedom of an individual generally and for religious freedoms specifically.
Between these two extremes there are many versions of separation of and cooperation between church and state. As described by
Professor W. Cole Durham, Jr.,7 there is a range of systems from the
most strict—even hostile—separationist models to the most friendly,
positive separationist schemes. This range includes models based on
accommodation, cooperation, and even churches supported or preferred by the state. Whichever model has been adopted, all democratic European nations begin with the principle of freedom of the individual to hold a particular belief or associate with a chosen religion
as provided for in Article 9 of the 1950 European Convention on
Human Rights.8 It should be emphasized at this point that Article 9
sets forth the freedom to manifest religion or belief, in community
6. When speaking about historical experience, one must not neglect the processes of
atheism imposed by the communist state, resulting sometimes in an official treatment of ideology in the quasi-religious category and providing an example of almost perfect symbiosis of
state and ideology. See MARY ANN GLENDON ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS IN A
NUTSHELL 403–04 (1994). It was a short-lived experiment, but it clearly made a significant
impact on the constitutional regulations adopted in that region of Europe.
7. W. Cole Durham, Jr., Bases para un estudio comparativo sobre libertad religiosa, in X
ANUARIO DE DERECHO ECLESIASTICO DEL ESTADO 465 (1994).
8. Article 9 of the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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with others and in public, and protects the teaching of religious beliefs as well. Therefore, regardless of different traditions, religious
structures, or historical experience, there is a common level of freedom for all democratic European states that must be guaranteed in
every country, for every religion, and for every belief.
However, the manner of granting these guaranteed freedoms, including the determination of relations between church and state, varies vastly. No need for uniformity is recognized. On the contrary, the
Declaration on the status of churches and non-confessional organizations of the Amsterdam Treaty states: “The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of
churches and religious associations or communities in the Members
States. The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organizations.”9
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL MODEL OF CHURCH-STATE
RELATIONS

The issue of freedom of religion (in its individual as well as its
collective aspect) is a delicate matter which is reflected in the careful
approach taken by the authors of the various European constitutions
on this issue. Drafters of European constitutions often encountered
historical or social traditions with which they did not want to interfere directly.
A. Constitutional Provisions Regarding Church and State
In Germany, the pertinent provisions of the 1919 Weimar Constitution are still valid on several fundamental issues. Therefore, the
decision of the drafters of the 1949 German Grundgesetz to absorb
the so-called Weimar church provisions to the Constitutions was the
result of “a compromise that become necessary because then proposals made during discussions on the Basic Law for a new regulation of
the relationship between State and churches were unable to find any
majority.”10 In Portugal, there is a complicated symbiosis maintained

9. 1997 O.J. (C 340) 133 (“L’Union européenne respecte et ne prejuge pas les statut
dont beneficient en vertu du droit national, les Eglises et les associations ou communautés religieuses dans les États membres. L’Union européenne respecte également la statut des organisations philosophiques et non confessionnelles.”).
10. D. Hoemig & W. Hassemer, Germany: Rechtsprechung der Verfassungsgerichte im
Bereich der Bekenntnisfreiheit, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 339
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between the 1940 Concordat with the Holy See, the 1971 Act on
Religious Freedom, and the 1976 Constitution.11 In Italy, in the
course of drafting the constitution, the Lateran Pacts were adopted
as the system regulating the relations between the state and the
Catholic Church.12 In France, following the concept of the “bloc of
constitutionality,”13 some fundamental regulations are stipulated in
the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, in the
Preamble to the 1946 Constitution, and in the Law of December 9,
1905 (which is considered to proclaim the “fundamental principles
of the Republic”).14 For the historical reasons, certain provisions relating to religious freedom flow from the Saint Germain Treaty for
Austria and from the Treaty of Lausanne for Turkey, which were
concluded after World War I.
B. State Churches and the Separationist Models
Within the above-mentioned meaning, there is no religious state
in Europe and, likewise, no atheistic state at present.15 Nevertheless
there are democratic countries which provide for the existence of a
state church16 or an official or dominant state religion.17 The Swedish
[hereinafter Hoemig & Hassemer].
11. J. de Sousa e Brito, La jurisprudence constitutionnelle en matière de liberté confessionelle au Portugal, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 555 [hereinafter
de Sousa e Brito].
12. Article 7 of the 1947 Constitution provides: “The State and the Catholic Church
are, each within its own ambit, independent and sovereign. Their relations are regulated by the
Lateran Pacts. Such amendments to these Pacts as are accepted by both parties do not require
any procedure of Constitutional amendment.” ITALY CONST. art. 7, in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Italy 48 (Gisbert H. Flanz ed.) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONS].
13. See DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 148 (L. Favoreu ed., 2000).
14. Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, La jurisprudence constitutionnelle en matière de liberté
confessionnelle et le régime juridique des cultes et de la liberté confessionnelle en France, in 1
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 305 [hereinafter Basdevant-Gaudemet].
Furthermore, several eastern French departments have a separate legal system for historical reasons.
15. It should be mentioned that the 1976 Constitution of communist Albania provided
for an atheistic state: “The State does not recognise a religion, it supports and develops the
atheistic propaganda to strengthen the scientific and material ideology among citizens.”
16. The 1953 Constitution of Denmark provides: “The Evangelical Lutheran Church
shall be the Established Church of Denmark, and, as such, it shall be supported by the State.”
DEN. CONST. art. 4, in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Denmark 15.
17. The 1814 Norwegian Constitution provides, “The Evangelical-Lutheran religion
shall remain the official religion of the State. The inhabitants professing it are bound to bring
up their children in the same.” NOR. CONST. art. 2, § 2, in 14 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
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Church enjoyed a special constitutional status for many decades until
recently when it was disestablished, at least in major part.18 At least in
the traditional sense, the Anglican Church forms a part of the state
machinery of England. Moreover, Israel represents a country with a
very strong religious component; the very notion of “the Jewish
State” speaks of the state’s attachment to a particular religion. Finally, Liechtenstein’s constitution (Article 37, Section 2, Sentence 1)
provides a pertinent example:
following the previous constitutional tradition, a strong significance
of the Roman Catholic Church is recognized, making it the State
church (Landeskirche), thus in other words, providing with the
public and legal status. . . . The model implemented in the Constitution may not be [however] considered as a legal regime setting
forth and allowing for only one Church (State Church) or such
where the state identifies with one Church only, still it is clearly oriented to the Roman Catholic State Church.19

Notwithstanding its preference for the Catholic Church, it is
clear that Liechtenstein’s constitution and its constitutional practice—as with any of the other countries mentioned herein—respect
freedom of religion within the meaning of Article 9 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
On the other hand, some constitutions define the state as “lay”20
or “secular.”21 This should not necessarily be understood as a rejec-

12, at Norway 1. The 1975 Constitution of Greece provides, “The prevailing religion in
Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Greece,” GREECE CONST. art. 3, in 7
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Greece 19; see also the 1991 Constitution of Bulgaria, infra
note 37 (Eastern Orthodox).
18. See Kenneth Stegeby, An Analysis of the Impending Disestablishment of the Church of
Sweden, 1999 BYU L. REV. 703.
19. H. Wille, Lichtenstein: Rechtsprechung der Verfasssungsgerichte im Bereich der Bekenntisnsfreiheit, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 466–67 [hereinafter
Wille].
20. The 1958 French Constitution (as amended July 31, 1995), provides, “France is an
indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It assures the equality of all citizens before
the law . . . . It respects . . . all beliefs.” FR. CONST. art 1, in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
12, at France 2; see also Corte cost., sez., 1989, n.203, (Italy).
21. The 1993 Russian Constitution provides, “1. The Russian Federation shall be a
secular state. No religion may be instituted as state-sponsored or mandatory religion. 2. Religious associations shall be separated from the State and are equal before the law.” KONST. RF
art. 14, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Russia 4. The concept of the “secular state”
is also used in Belarus. Belarus: Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion
and Beliefs, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 157.
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tion of or hostility towards religion.22 In our contemporary understanding, it is rather a manner of expressing the neutrality of the
state: “The judicial system is one of strict separation between the
State and religious confessions. This means that the State does not
officially recognize any one religion.”23 Another example of secularism is found in Turkey. Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution of Turkey
describes the Republic of Turkey as a “secular state.”24 This should
be understood against the history of modernization of Turkey in the
Ataturk period and against the role that Islam would like to play in
modern times. Therefore,
“the Constitutional Court has based its views regarding the freedom of religion and conscience on the principle of secularism, and
it has also provided a contemporary meaning and content to that
principle through its decisions. According to the Constitutional
Court, secularism cannot be confined to a separation between the
public and religious domain. It is an environment of freedom, civilization and modernity with a larger scope and dimension. . . .
What are determining and effective over the state are science and
wisdom and not religious rules and requirements.”25

C. The Principles of Non-identification and Neutrality
In general, it seems that constitutions refrain from general definitions such that the model of church-state relations is defined only in
a country’s constitutional jurisprudence. Almost all national reports
refer to two fundamental principles of constitutional jurisprudence
on the subject of religious liberty: non-identification and neutrality.
1. The principle of non-identification
Non-identification means that “according to the case law of the
Constitutional Court, any system of a state Church, and even any
22. In this context, it is possible to talk about an “aggressive laicisme” which existed in
France at the end of the nineteenths Century. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 283.
23. “Le regime juridique est celui d’une strict separation entre l’État et les confessions
religieuses. Cela implique que l’État ne reconnaisse aucun culte.” Id. at 306.
24. In addition, Article 174 provides for special protection of this principle: “No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the
Reform Laws, indicated below, which aim . . . to safeguard the secular character of the Republic.” TURK. CONST. art. 174.
25. Turkey: Freedom of Conscience and Religion and Doctrines of the Constitutional
Court, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 834 [hereinafter Turkey].
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system of identification of the state with a particular religion or a particular set of ideas, has to be excluded.”26 According to this principle,
no state religion or official religion may exist in a country,27 not even
a privileged religion.28 The rejection of official state churches or
religions is best understood against the background principle of
pluralism:
the prohibition of any confusion of the religious functions and the
state functions is warranted by the nonconfessional character of the

26. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Die Rechtsprechung des Oestereichischen Verfassungsgerichtshofs
auf dem Gebiet der Glaubenfreiheit, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at
120 [hereinafter Kucsko-Stadlmayer].
27. The 1919 Constitution of Germany (retained in force by Article 140 of the 1949
Grundgesetz) provides, “There shall be no state church.” F.R.G. CONST. art. 137 § 1, in 7
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Germany 179. See also Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note
14, at 307; R. de Mendizabal Allende et al., Spain: La jurisprudence constitutionnelle en
matière de liberté confessionnelle, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1 [hereinafter de Mendizibal Allende et al.]; A. Hungerbuehler & M. Feraud, Switzerland: Die
Rechtsprechung des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts im Bereich der Bekenntnisfreiheit, in 2
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 820 [hereinafter Hungerbuehler &
Feraud]; Russia: La liberté de conscience dnas la Féderation de Russie, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 647 [hereinafter Russia].
In the Czech Republic, Article 2, Section 1 of the 1991 Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms provides, “The State . . . must not be tied either to an exclusive ideology or to a particular religion.” CZECH REP. CONST., in 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Czech Republic 152.
In Lithuania, the 1992 Constitution provides:
1. The State shall recognize traditional Lithuanian Churches and religious organizations, as well as other Churches and religious organizations provided that they have
a basis in society and their teaching and rituals do not contradict morality or the law.
2. Churches and religious organizations recognized by the State shall have the rights
of legal persons.
3. Churches and religious organizations shall freely proclaim the teaching of their
faith, perform the rituals of their belief, and have houses of prayer, charity institutions, and educational institutions for the training of priests of their faith.
4. Churches and religious organizations shall function freely according to their canons and statutes.
5. The status of Churches and other religious organizations shall be established by
agreements or by law.
6. The teaching proclaimed by Churches and religious organizations, other religious
activities, and houses of prayer may not be used for purposes which contradict the
Constitution and the law.
7. There shall not be a State religion in Lithuania
LITH. CONST. art. 43, in 11 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Lithuania 6–7.; see also A.
Matijosius, Some Legal Aspects of Religion and Belief in Lithuania, Address presented at the J.
Reuben Clark Law School Annual Symposium on International Law and Religion (Oct. 2000).
28. See Macedonia: Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion and
Beliefs, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 501 [hereinafter Macedonia].
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state, which results from the pluralistic structure of religions existing in the society, as well as by the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom which applies to both, individuals and religious
groups.29

Non-identification should also be viewed as a guarantee of religious freedom (church autonomy) that prohibits the state from
usurping functions of religious organizations.
2. The principle of neutrality
Neutrality is to a large extent synonymous with nonidentification. It is a result of a plurality of ideologies and religions,
and, at the same time, it must mean non-identification. But neutrality does not have to be equivalent to indifference by the state towards religion as a social phenomenon. In this respect, the modern
French notion of positive “laicism serves as the foundation of judicial
principles that seek to ensure the neutrality of public power regarding religion and to ensure equal treatment of diverse religious expressions.”30
Neutrality means first of all state impartiality towards various existing religions and ideologies.31 But it also requires that the state observe principles of freedom32 and equality.33 In this sense, neutrality
is understood as a consequence of separation.34 However, neutrality

29. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 767. An understanding of the
First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is instructive in this context: “The ‘establishment of
religion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another . . . .” Everson v. Board of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). See
also Macedonia, supra note 28, at 503 (referring to a decision of the Constitutional Court concerning the powers of the state authorities regarding in respect to issuing building permits).
30. Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 283 (“elle sert de fondement à des principes
juridiques qui visent à assurer la neutralité des pouvoirs publics à l’egard du fait religieux et à
assurer un traitement égal à ses diverses expressions”).
31. For example, the 1997 Constitution of Poland states, “The relationship between the
State and churches and other religious organizations is based on the principle of respect for
their autonomy and the mutual independence of each in its own sphere, as well as on the principle of cooperation for the good of the individual and for the common good.” POL. CONST.
art. 25, § 3, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Poland 6.
32. See the September 4, 1992 decision of the Czech Constitutional Court upholding
the constitutionality of prohibition of movements propagating national, racial, class or religious
hatred.
33. See infra Part IV.
34. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 566.
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should not eliminate the cultural tradition of particular societies,
which in Europe have always been related to Christianity. Sometimes
neutrality is reflected in the language of constitutional texts (e.g., Invocatio Dei and preambles to other constitutions,35 state symbols, the
notion of “traditional” or “recognized” churches) and sometimes in
ordinary statutes.36
D. Separation, Autonomy, and Cooperation
Non-identification and neutrality assume separation of church
and state, but generally the separation is not an absolute one. Some
constitutions directly set forth this principle of separation.37 But in
post-Communist states, such separationist wording has negative historical connotations38 and its usage is generally avoided. In Switzer-

35. For example, the Preamble to the 1937 Constitution of Ireland states, “In the name
of the Most Holy Trinity . . . We, the people of Eire, Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ . . . .” 9 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Ireland 1.
The preamble to the 1949 German Grundgesetz [Constitution] begins, “Conscious of their
responsibility before God and man . . . .” 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Germany 105.
The Preamble to Poland’s 1997 Constitution similarly states, “We, the Polish Nation, all citizens of the Republic, encompassing those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice,
goodness and beauty, as well as those who do not share such faith but respect those universal
values . . . recognizing our responsibility before God or our own consciences . . . .” XV
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Poland 1. The preamble to the 1999 Swiss Constitution
begins, “In the Name of Almighty God!” 17 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Switzerland
167.
36. For example, the preamble to a Lithuanian act provides that “the Lithuanian State is
based on Christian cultural foundation of United Europe.” Lithuanian Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion and Belief, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 479 [hereinafter Lithuanian Jurisprudence].
37. For example, the 1949 Hungarian Constitution states, “In the Republic of Hungary
the Church functions in separation from the State.” HUNG. CONST. art. 60, § 3, in 8
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Hungary 16. This entails “a consequent separation of the
churches from the State, the neutrality of the State in religious matters and the equality of the
rights of all churches.” Adam, La jurisprudence constitutionnelle Hongroise en matière de liberté
confessionnelle, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 365. See also PORT.
CONST. art. 41, § 4, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Portugal 27 (“Churches and
religious communities are independent of the State and are free to determine their own organization and to perform their own ceremonies and worship.”); SLOVN. CONST. art. 7, § 1,
in 16 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Slovenia 2 (“The State and religious groups shall
separate.” ); Article 14, Section 2 of the 1993 Constitution of Russia, supra note 21; BULG.
CONST. art. 13, §§ 2, 3, in 3 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Bulgaria 89 (“Religious institutions are separate from the State,” however, “[t]he Eastern Orthodox religion is the traditional religion of the Republic of Bulgaria.”).
38. See Slovenia: Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion and
Belief, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 707 [hereinafter Slovenia].
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land, some cantons (e.g., Geneva and Neuenburg) have introduced
the concept of separation of church and state, but in 1980, a popular
referendum to implement complete separation of church and state
was rejected.39
The notion of separation of church and state means autonomy of
both entities and should not be understood as a manifestation of
state hostility towards religion40 or even as the manifestation of state
indifference towards religion. In Portugal, the Constitution indicates
that it “imposes laicité [separation of church and state] but not laicisme [a hostile implementation of this separation].”41 Austria is described as “not a completely secular state, since the separation of
Church and State has not been clearly conducted.”42 The German
Federal Constitutional Court refers to the attitude of “separation not
absolute but ‘lame’ (hinkende Trennung) featured as a transformed
independence within the coordination system or as the partnership
of churches and the State.”43 The system existing in Belgium is presented as the system which “is neither a concordat regime, nor an
absolute separationist regime. It is a regime of reciprocal independence combined with a system of benefits accorded by the state to
certain religions.”44 In Slovakia, one refers to “the specified separation of the State and churches and religious communities.”45
In sum, the principal of separation of church and state is considered not only as admitting, but even as assuming, some cooperation
between church and state. Even the definition of the state as “secular” is not contradictory to it: “The Constitution does not foresee

39. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 820.
40. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (stating, “But we find no
constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for the government to be hostile to religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious influence.”).
41. de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 562.
42. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 121.
43. Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 339.
44. The original French states, “n’est ni un regime concordataire, ni un regime de separation absolute. C’est un regime d’independence reciproque combine avec un system d’aide
positive accordeé par l’État à certains cultes.” E. Cerexhe & H. Boel, Belgium: La jurisprudence constitutionnelle en matière de liberté confessionnelle, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 197 [hereinafter Cerexhe & Boel].
45. Slovak Republic: Verfassungsmassige Entscheidungstatigkeit in der Sachen de
Glaubensfreiheit, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 670 [hereinafter
Slovak Republic].
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any cooperation between the state and religious communities. Nevertheless, the state shall not ignore religion.”46
In some constitutions, however, the notion of “separation” is replaced by the notion of “autonomy and cooperation.”47 Such a depiction does not only demonstrate that these constitutions do not
prohibit state cooperation with (and thus some assistance to)
churches, but also suggests that it is possible to define certain state
obligations in this area. Thus, according to Article 16, Section 3 of
the 1978 Constitution of Spain, “public authorities take into consideration religion of society and maintain the resulting cooperation
with the Catholic Church and other religions.” This is linked with
the conviction that “respect of religious beliefs belongs to the foundations of democratic cohabitation.”48 In a similar context, the Swiss
drafters mention a state obligation to guarantee religious peace49 and
a Hungarian author indicates that “religious values are considered as
constitutional values. Therefore, the protection and promotion of religious values by the State is effected through a traditional cooperation.”50 In the Italian system, the principle of a secular state (expressed in Decision Number 203 of 1989) is one of the defining
elements of the Italian regime. This does not mean that the state
must ignore existing religions but rather constitutes a state guarantee
for the protection of religious freedom in the pluralistic religious and
cultural system.51 In the 1987 decision of Constitutional Court of
Portugal, it was stated that the state obligation is not only to allow
the operation of particular religions but that the state is obliged to
cooperate with such religions as “religious needs have become a legally recognized right that the state must ensure.”52 The 1993 decision of the Polish Constitutional Court indicated that separation
does not assume isolationism or competitiveness but rather an opportunity to cooperate in domains which serve the common good
46. The original French states, “La Constitution ne prevoit aucune cooperation entre
l’État et communautés religieuses. Neamoins, les pouvoirs publics et le legislateur n’ignore pas
le fait religieux.” Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 311.
47. See, e.g., art. 25, § 3 of the 1997 Constitution of Poland, supra note 31.
48. de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 770.
49. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 805.
50. Adam, supra note 37, at 369.
51. See Italy: La jurisprudence constitutionnelle en matière de liberté confessionnelle, in 1
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 425 [hereinafter Italy].
52. The original French states, “les besoins religieux sont devenus un bien juridique que
l’État doit assuré.” de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 587.
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and the development of the individual.53
Regardless of the constitutional wording and the language of judicial decisions, the “wall of separation” between church and state is
nowhere to be found today. On the contrary, the constitutional pattern of cooperation (sometimes also understood as enhancing positive state obligations to support churches) should be considered as
the most commonly accepted model.
III. THE FREEDOM TO ESTABLISH RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES:
“RECOGNIZED CHURCHES”
State approaches to churches and religious communities are primarily determined by the principle that an individual is guaranteed
freedom of religion. Thus, the state may not abolish or differentiate
the freedom of establishing churches and religious communities nor
may it discriminate against or favor individuals because of their religious affiliation (or lack thereof). This prohibition against discrimination is reflected both in constitutional provisions and in the case
law of constitutional courts.
In the countries discussed herein, there is a recognized freedom
to establish churches and other religious communities. But this freedom does not bar the state from participation in such processes.
When a religious community seeks recognition, it usually looks for
some support from the state, and thus must undergo some form of
state procedures. There are two fundamental models in this area:
registration with the state as a religious entity and formation of an
association under private law.
A. State Registration and Private Associations
1. State Registration
The first model consists of a uniform requirement of state registration of churches and religious communities. If a given religious
community wishes to obtain such status, it has to be registered. Only
in a few states is registration an obligatory condition for a church to

53. See, e.g., A. Maczynski, Poland: Freedom of Religion and Beliefs in the Jurisprudence
of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at
543 [hereinafter Maczynski]. Since 1997 the principle of cooperation is grounded in Article
25, Section 3 of the Constitution of Poland. See supra note 31.
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be able to operate at all.54 As a general rule, there are no legal obstacles to operate without registration,55 but if a church is not registered, it is impossible to obtain a legal personality and receive some
legal benefits.56 To register a community, several requirements are
generally specified: 1) documentation of a specified number of followers (e.g., 10 persons in Russia and Belarus, 15 persons in Lithuania, and 100 persons in Hungary); 2) furnishing the state with internal statutes (this may also include information about the group’s
doctrine in order to assess the religious nature of the group); and 3)
information about the composition of church authorities. As a general rule, the power to register belongs to a state administrative
agency (in the form of an administrative decision)57 and generally,
there is a guarantee of judicial review.58
Although the registration system is uniform, a different approach
is sometimes used for traditional churches. In Lithuania, the Act on
Religious Communities and Associations distinguishes “traditional”
religious communities (the notion of “church” is not used by this
Act), combining the term tradition with a historical, spiritual, and
social heritage of Lithuania. Such traditional communities have been
recognized ex lege. Nontraditional religious communities must be
registered. While there is no legal impediment to nontraditional religions being granted the status of traditional communities, this may
only occur after twenty-five years.59 In Russia, the 1997 Act on Freedom of Belief and on Religious Associations provided for a facilitated
registration procedure for religious organizations which have existed
in a given area for at least fifteen years. Under the Act, other organizations would have to renew their registration annually.60 The annual
re-registration requirement was subsequently challenged before the

54. See Slovak Republic, supra note 45, at 668; Macedonia, supra note 28, at 502–03.
55. See, e.g., Lithuanian Jurisprudence, supra note 36, at 478. But see Russia, supra note
27, at 651 (noting that in Russia the law requires that the state authorities be notified about
the creation of a religious community).
56. See, e.g., Romania: Rapport relatif à la jurisprudence constitutionnelle en matière
confessionnelle, in 2 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 632 [hereinafter Romania] (noting significantly the difference between “recognized” and “barely tolerated” religions).
57. See Slovenia, supra note 38, at 705.
58. In Hungary, a registration, as such, is already made by the court. See Adam, supra
note 37, at 367.
59. See Lithuanian Jurisprudence, supra note 36, at 487.
60. See Russia, supra note 27, at 651.
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Russian Constitutional Court. In a decision dated November 23,
1999, the Court did not invalidate this provision but, in deciding
that it does not apply to churches that had come into existence before the 1997 Act was adopted, the decision left the provision without any real significance.
2. Association Status
The second model consists of admitting churches and religious
communities to be organized in the form of an association or other
private law organization. According to this model, religious groups
fall under a general system of organizations and are not differentiated
by a separate (and more restrictive) registration procedure. Notwithstanding this nondifferentiation, in most countries, a group of traditional churches continue to maintain differing legal status, which follows from the understanding that legal provisions do not wish to
ignore the sociological fact of the stabilizing effects of certain religions.
Even in France, where the principle of separation of church and
state is understood as the strictest, these facts are recognized by law.
In principle, there is no need for the state to recognize particular religions. Religious organizations or groups wishing to be included
into the structure of state law and to obtain legal personality use the
form of an association. Those groups not accorded the status of an
association cultuelle, cannot be granted some privileges, particularly
in regard to financial matters.61 At the same time, although, “legally
speaking, the State does not recognize any religion, in practice it
knows six.”62 Notwithstanding the strict separationist French model,
in practice six major religions are granted the status of state cooperation. In Belgium, the idea of state recognition was already present in
the nineteenths century in the constitutional provisions discussing
“recognized religions”63 or “public worship.”64 This status allows

61. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 303, 310 (giving information about a
recent decision of the Lyon Court attempting to define religion).
62. The original French states: “juridiquement, l’État ne ‘reconnait’ aucun culte, en
pratique il en ‘connait’ six.” Id. at 306.
63. The 1831 Constitution provides:
Education is free; any preventive measures shall be forbidden; the punishment of
misdemeanors shall be regulated only by law or decree. The Community shall guarantee the freedom of choice of parents. The Community provides neutral instruction. Neutrality implies, in particular, respect for the philosophical, ideological, or

481

GAR-PP1.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

6/25/01 9:07 PM

[2001

churches to enjoy support from the state. Historical and sociological
realities are decisive in this case.65
A historical criterion is clearly articulated in Article 137, Section
5 of the 1919 German Constitution which provided that those religious communities with the status of a public association before the
Constitution became effective maintained the same legal position ex
lege. Other communities may receive status of a public association if
their structure and the number of members guarantees their longterm durability.66 The remaining religious communities may have
civil law status which is limited in its privileges.67
In Austria, a system of recognized churches is applied. The recognition of churches is effected by statutes of Parliament, and, thus,
a church is granted the legal position of a public institution. The
above-mentioned regulations date back to 1874 and formulate the
most important requirements of recognition (e.g., at least 2,000 followers, a positive faith in God, a defined source of faith, economic
and personal ability to establish the church, and at least one religious
community). It seems plausible that the Austrian regulation was a
distant inspiration of the registration system adopted in the modern
Eastern Europe. At present, eleven churches and communities are
recognized in this way. The Roman Catholic Church has “historical
recognition” attributable to the fact that Catholicism was the state
religion in Austria until 1867.68 In Poland, a registration system is
applied. Simultaneously, the Polish Constitution provides for a statutory form of regulation over relations between the state and several

religious conceptions of parents and pupils. The schools organized by public authorities shall offer, up through the end of obligatory schooling, a choice between
instruction in one of the recognized religions or instruction in nonreligious morality.
BELG. CONST. art. 24, § 1, in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Belgium 4.
64. Article 181, Section 1 provides, “The salaries of ministers of religion are chargeable
to the State . . . .” Id. at 40.
65. See, e.g., Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 201 (indicating that there are six “recognized cults” and recalling that the 1993 Amendment to the Constitution has extended the
application of Article 181 to nonreligious lay organizations).
66. The Federal Constitutional Court has indicated that durability means the ability of a
religious community to fulfill for a substantial period its obligation. Of particular importance
was the 1991 Decision in the Bahá’í communities case.
67. See, e.g., Gerhard Robbers, Religious Freedom in Germany, 2001 BYU L. REV. 650–
51 (referring to a pending case concerning the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ claim to receive “public
law association” status).
68. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 103.
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important churches and separately refers to the Catholic Church.69
In Switzerland, “main churches” received the status of a public
legal corporation. Cantons make such decisions, which are often included in the very text of the cantons’ constitutions. In practice, this
means that a church is recognized as a legal and public institution
“upon a referendum effected in accordance with the requirements of
democracy.”70 Accordingly, there are three “traditionally main
churches.” Other religious communities may be organized only in
private-law forms, and if they are established as ordinary associations,
then they are exempted from registration. In Liechtenstein, a Landeskirche still exists, and the Catholic Church enjoys the status of a
public law person. Other religions may be granted such status pursuant to a statute of Parliament, which has not yet been promulgated.
Therefore, other religions adopt private law forms for their organization.71 In Portugal, a unique position for the Catholic Church results
from the Concordat, which grants the Catholic Church an international legal person status. Other churches operate now in the form of
private law associations but the draft act on religious freedom seeks
to amend it.72
The Spanish system is seemingly the closest one to registration.
Although religious communities may be established without an initial authorization and registration, in order to be granted a special
legal status it is necessary to be registered by the Minister of Justice.
The principle of concluding agreements between the state and the
most significant churches providing for the scope of their relations
with the state seems to be of the utmost importance.73 The 1978
Constitution of Spain refers separately to the Catholic Church.74 This
69. The 1997 Constitution provides:
The relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church are
determined by international treaty concluded with the Holy See, and by law.
The relations between the Republic of Poland and other churches and religious organizations are determined by laws adopted pursuant to agreements concluded between their appropriate representatives and the Council of Ministers.
POL. CONST. art. 25, §§ 4, 5, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Poland 6.
70. Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 824.
71. See Wille, supra note 19, at 464–65.
72. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 580–82.
73. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 775.
74. Article 16, Section 3 provides, “No religion shall have a state character. The public
powers shall take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish society and maintain the appropriate relations of cooperation with the Catholic Church and other denominations.” 17
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Spain 46.
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unique treatment of the Catholic Church is understandable given
both the confessional structure of Spanish society as well as the quite
recent historical experience of the state church.
B. Concluding Agreements and Concordats
There are different forms of legal regulation of churches and religious organizations. The fundamental issues are decided at the constitutional level in all states (or by other acts of constitutional rank,
such as the French Law of 1905). In most countries there are also
statutes which specify generally the relation between church and
state, and pertain uniformly to all churches and religious groups.
Frequently, general Freedom of Religion Acts occupy a privileged
position within a country’s legal system.75 Usually, more detailed
provisions are laid out in other legislative statutes or in regulations
issued by other governmental bodies. The distinction between external and internal matters follows from the general principle of autonomy of churches, and it is assumed that the legislature may regulate
only external matters.76
In some countries there are separate statutes regulating the position of particular churches and religions. It is typical for states which
differentiate recognized churches to regulate them in separate statutes, thereby admitting and even assuming a different position for
these particular churches based on their public role. Such regulation
may coexist (e.g., Austria and Poland) or replace (e.g., Belgium) the
general Freedom of Religion Act discussed above. In Austria, specific
statutes are applicable to four churches (and seven more have been
recognized by way of ordinance).77 There are six such recognized
churches in Belgium78 and twelve in Poland. Because, in Poland, the
system of separate statutes has been linked to negotiated agreements
between the state and various churches, this protection affords more
durable relations.
The practice of concluding agreements between the state and
particular churches or religious organizations is also widespread.
75. In Romania, it should be adopted as the Organic Act. ROM. CONST. art. 72, § 2(n).
In Hungary, its adoption requires an absolute majority of two-thirds of all votes cast. See
Adam, supra note 37, at 361.
76. See, e.g., Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 821 (referring to a 1994 decision of the Federal Supreme Court).
77. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 122.
78. See Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 201.
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These concluding documents make it possible to tailor the relationship according to the traits of particular religions. The form of these
agreements also provides for additional guarantees for the church
because they limit the possibility of unilateral actions of the state.79
Such agreements exist in Germany, Italy, Spain, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. In Lithuania, concluding agreements are provided for in Article 43, Section 5 of the Constitution.80 In Italy, relations between the state and non-Catholic religions may be regulated
in the form of accords, as a basis for the issuance of legislative statutes.81 In Spain, concluding agreements have been formed with three
fundamental religions, but in order to come into effect each agreement has to be approved in the form of an legislative act. This means
that, among other things, the provisions of the agreement subject to
such approval have the legal significance of a statute passed by the
legislature.82 The same regulation is provided for in the draft of the
new Portuguese Act on Religious Freedom.83 The relations between
the state and the most prominent churches in Poland are provided
for by statute. However, the 1997 Constitution in Article 25, Section 5 requires that these statutes “are adopted pursuant to the
agreements concluded between the Council of Ministers and appropriate representatives” of particular churches. Thus, when Parliament
adopts these statutes, it is bound by the provisions of the agreements.84
The Concordats between the Holy See and particular countries
are unique because they specifically apply to the status of the Catholic Church and various aspects of the Catholic Church’s cooperation
with the state. For example, in Poland, the Constitution adopts the
concordat form of regulation.85 In several other countries, the
Catholic Church’s special status follows from tradition and a
recognition of the particularly important role of the Catholic
Church. However, it should be noted that concordats are not
utilized in all countries and that it is possible to enter into more than
79. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 346.
80. See supra note 27.
81. It applies practically to five religions. See Italy, supra note 51, at 425.
82. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 774.
83. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 579.
84. See Maczynski, supra note 53, at 549. See also the 1998 decision of the Constitutional Court dealing with rights of the churches to be consulted during the legislative procedure.
85. See supra note 69.

485

GAR-PP1.DOC

6/25/01 9:07 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2001

countries and that it is possible to enter into more than one international agreement with the Holy See (e.g., Spain and Hungary).
Some countries do not see the need to enter into a concordat.86
The consequence of entering into a concordat (or other similar
agreements) is that the relation between the state and the Catholic
Church is partially transferred into the domain of international law.
Consequently, concordats are a more complete guarantee that the
agreed-upon regulatory arrangement will not be unilaterally changed
by the state. Nevertheless, the provisions of the concordat must conform to pertinent constitutional provisions.87
In Italy, Article 7 of the 1947 Constitution refers the regulation
of the relations of the state and the Catholic Church to the 1929
Lateran Pacts, at the same time providing that “the amendment to
the Pacts approved by both parties does not require the Constitution
to be amended.” Against this backdrop, there are several significant
decisions of the Constitutional Court connected with the 1984
Amendment to the Concordat.88 Moreover, in Portugal, the concordat precedes the Constitution, but as opposed to the situation in Italy, the Portuguese Constitution does not deal with this issue. It
provides grounds to the statements about a silent repeal of certain
concordat provisions, and the courts do not have an easy task in adjusting these documents.89
C. State Limitations on Religious Freedom
The general principle of freedom to establish churches and religious organizations is not absolute and may be subjected to certain
limitations.90 In the countries discussed herein, mechanisms of state
supervision exist. Most notably, two important limitations include:
1) repeal of state-granted registration status; and 2) dissolution of an
86. See, e.g., Lithuanian Jurisprudence, supra note 36, at 484; Slovenia, supra note 38,
at 701.
87. See the 1957 decision of the German Constitutional Court on the effects of the
constitutional principle of federalism on the provisions of the 1933 Concordat.
88. See, in particular, decision no. 203/1989 of the Constitutional Court which provides for the verification of the conformity of the Concordat provisions with the “supreme
principles of the Constitutional order.”
89. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 555.
90. Article 9, Section 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights discusses appropriate state limitations that may be placed upon religious liberty. See European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4,
1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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association created under private law. These two limitations are particularly significant in light of the development of new churches and
para-religious groups.
1. The phenomenon of so-called sectes
In the countries discussed herein, there are no legal provisions
directly referring to the phenomenon of so-called sectes.91 Indeed,
“the notion of a secte does not correspond with any legal category in
our system.”92 However, the issue has already emerged in the political sphere.93
In principle, sectes may invoke principles of religious freedom and
act within the system of churches and religious organizations.94 But
to do so, a registration would be required or, at least, a recognition
by the state, if a given religious organization is to receive support
from the state. For this reason, it becomes necessary to determine
whether a given group is indeed religious. It is beyond doubt that
the status of a religious group may not be granted to an organization
that, for example, represents national socialist ideology or is based on
a particular language or ethnic identity.95 The law may also require
that the motivations or objectives of a group are “not directed to
achieve only worldly goods.”96 A registration or recognition may also
be rejected if religious activity is not the only objective of the
group.97
In Portugal, the 1971 Act does not allow any activities related to
the metaphysical or parapsychological phenomena to be included in

91. Secte translates directly into English as “cult.”
92. de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 763; accord Basdevant-Gaudemet,
supra note 14, at 301; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 118; Russia, supra note 27, at
646; Lithuanian Jurisprudence, supra note 36, at 483; Wille, supra note 19, at 463. For Portugal, de Sousa e Brito draws attention to the fact that the very use of the notion of secte may
raise constitutional doubts. See supra note 11, at 565.
93. For a discussion of parliamentary actions in France, see Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra
note 14, at 301–02; for the same in Spain, see de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at
763–64.
94. See Slovenia, supra note 38, at 677.
95. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 98 (citing decisions of the Austrian Constitutional Court).
96. See the 1998 decision of the Polish Supreme Administrative Court regarding the
Church of Scientology.
97. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 303 (citing several decisions of the
French Conseil d’État pertaining to Jehovah’s Witnesses).
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the notion of religion.98 In Italy, the religious nature of a group has
to be proven, at least where a group claims tax exemptions or seeks
other benefits from the state.99 In Bulgaria, the state seeks to limit
the establishment of associations whose activities are not covered by
the constitutional freedom of religion.100
Even if it were possible to categorize a secte as a religious organization,101 limitations still exist that even recognized churches or religious groups must respect. The activities of sectes are protected by religious freedom principles if “protection granted is not contradictory
to other constitutional values and if their behavior does not cause a
noticeable harm for society or fundamental rights of other people.”102 Thus, activities of sectes must be in compliance with the
law.103
The role of the state is particularly strong in countries which
adopt the registration system because groups whose activities violate
the law (and in particular threaten the interests of minors) may not
be registered or their registration may be revoked.104 The question
arises to what extent the criterion of loyalty to the state should be
considered.105
In deciding whether a particular limitation of para-religious practices should be allowed, the courts have adopted a test of proportionality.106 Of course a question arises whether such limitations can
also be imposed on traditional churches with an international presence. The general boundary of such limitations is set by the prohibition of discriminatory treatment, to be discussed below.
98. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 565.
99. See Italy, supra note 51, at 396.
100. See Bulgaria: Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion and
Beliefs, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 227 [hereinafter Bulgaria].
101. See id. at 303 (citing a 1997 French case involving the Church of Scientology).
102. Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 329 (citing a 1972 decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court).
103. See Slovenia, supra note 38, at 697; Romania, supra note 56, at 629.
104. See Czech Republic: Constitutional Jurisprudence in the Area of Freedom of Religion
and Beliefs, in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 1, at 265 [hereinafter Czech
Republic]. See also the examples from Russia, Russia, supra note 27, at 654, and Belarus, Belarus, supra note 21, at 156.
105. For example, since Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse any kind of military service (even the
so-called Ersatzdienst), their church still lacks the status of a “public law association” in Germany. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 351.
106. See Czech Republic, supra note 104, at 265 (describing the ban on the cult of Satan
due to the protection of morals in that country).
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The constitutional courts are also ready to affirm that secte membership may have adverse effects on the exercise of other rights and
freedoms. For example, the Swiss Federal Court affirmed the withdrawal of a license for a security guard company that was linked to a
dangerous secte. The same court refused a license to establish a private school to an entity close to the Church of Scientology.107 Moreover, a 1992 French court decision affirmed the denial of permission
to adopt children for those who are prohibited by their religion to
accept blood transfusions.108 Finally, there is no constitutional violation if the state undertakes or financially supports activities aimed at
informing young people about the dangerous activities of specific sectes.109
In conclusion, churches or religious organizations, from the
moment of establishment or recognition by the state, are not treated
in the same way. It should be regarded as an expression of certain
regularity: within the general principle of equality and nondiscrimination there is a difference in the placement of particular
churches and religious groups. In the doctrine, this phenomenon is
described as the “defined multi-tiered structure of religious entities.”110
IV.

THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY: CRITERIA OF PERMITTED
DIFFERENTIATION

A. The Principle of Equality of Individuals in the Religious Liberty
Context
All civilized legal orders provide for the general principle of
equality concerning the legal status of their citizens. At the same
time, many constitutions make special reference to the principle of
equality as it specifically pertains to religion. Many constitutions
clearly prohibit discrimination based on religion.111
107. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 819–20.
108. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 304.
109. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 348; Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra
note 27, at 820, 822.
110. Silvio Ferrari, Church and State in Europe: Common Patterns and Challenges, in
WHICH RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CHURCHES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION?: THOUGHTS
FOR THE FUTURE (H.-J. Kiderlen et al. eds., 1995) (citing opinions of W. Cole Durham, Jr.).
111. See, e.g., ITALY CONST. art. 3, in 9 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Italy 47 (“All
citizens . . . are equal before the law, without distinction as to . . . religion . . . .” ); F.R.D.
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This understanding of equality of individuals resulted in the development of case law in many countries, which treats the ban of discrimination as one of the premises of freedom of religion. “The principle of equality prevents all types of discrimination between citizens
and religious communities based on their ideology or beliefs, such
that religious attitudes can not justify difference of treatment under
the law.”112 In this area, general interpretation of the principle of
equality, in particular the principle of proportionality, are applied.
B. The Principle of Equality of Groups in the Religious Liberty Context
In contrast to its application to individuals, the application of the
principle of equality to churches and religious groups is far more
complex. Some constitutions explicitly provide for equality before
the law for churches or religious groups (e.g., Article 7, Section 2 of
the 1991 Slovenian Constitution113 and Article 14 of the 1993 Russian Constitution.)114 In Poland, the 1997 Constitution provides for
“equality of rights” of churches and religious organizations,115 which
is, however, not equivalent to the general notion of equality. In
Hungary, the 1990 Act on Freedom of Religion and on Churches
provides for that “churches exercise identical rights and are encumbered with identical duties.” The Italian Constitution, although it
refers specifically to the Catholic Church, assumes as a general principle that all religions are equal before law.
CONST. art. 3, § 3, in 7 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Germany 106 (“Nobody shall be
prejudiced or favoured because of their . . . religion . . . .” ); RUSS. CONST. art. 19, § 2, in 15
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Russia 6 (“The State shall guarantee the equality of rights
and liberties regardless of . . . attitude to religion . . . . Any restriction of the rights of citizens . . . on religious grounds shall be forbidden.” ); HUNG. CONST. art. 70/A, § 1, in 8
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Hungary 17 (“The Republic . . . guarantees for all persons
in its territory human and civil rights without discrimination on account of . . . religion . . . .”);
LITH. CONST. art 29, § 1, in 11 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Lithuania 4 (“A person
may not have his rights restricted in any way, or be granted any privileges, on the basis of . . .
religion . . . .”); see also Article 6 of the 1955 Staatsvertrag von Wien.
112. de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 766 (quoting a 1982 decision of the
Constitutional Court of Spain) (“Le principe d’égalité pour sa part empêche d’établir tout type
de discrimination entre les citoyens et les communautés religieuses en fonction de leur ideologie ou croyances, de façon que les attitudes religieuses des sujects de droit ne peuvent justifier
de difference du traitement juridique.”); see also Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 178–79
(citing a 1993 decision of the Cour d’Arbitrage of Belgium).
113. See supra note 37.
114. See supra note 21.
115. “Churches and other religious organizations shall have equal rights.” POL. CONST.
art. 25, § 1, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Poland 6.
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However, at the constitutional level, the differentiation of
churches is often implied or allowed. Clearly, it is seen in all countries where there is an official state church. Even where there is not a
state church, constitutions may refer to a particular church. Such is
the case with the Constitutions of Spain116 and Poland,117 which refer
specifically to the Catholic Church. Similarly, the Orthodox Church
is referenced in the 1991 Constitution of Macedonia118 and in the
1991 Constitution of Bulgaria.119 In Portugal, the 1940 Concordat
requires that the state recognize “the principles of Christian doctrine
and morality, traditional for the country.”120 The 1997 Russian Law
on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations recognizes “a
particular role of Orthodox religion in the history of Russia, for the
future and the development of spirituality and culture” and expresses
respect for Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions.121 Other constitutions, like that of Belgium, name no religion
but formulate a category of recognized religions or cults. These examples all suggest situations “in which main religions are privileged
to some extent,”122 and this observation seems to be representative
for almost all countries discussed herein.123
The scope of privileges granted to “main churches” depends on
many factors but primarily on the religious structure of society. Privileges for traditional churches will be found in particular in those

116. See supra note 74.
117. See supra note 69.
118. The precise language states:
The freedom of religious confession is guaranteed.
The right to express one’s faith freely and publicly, individually or with others is
guaranteed.
The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are
separate from the state and equal before the law.
The Macedonian Orthodox Church and other religious communities and groups are
free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions, by way of a procedure regulated by law.
MACED. CONST. art. 19, in 11 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Macedonia 10.
119. See supra note 37.
120. de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 571.
121. Russia, supra note 27, at 650 (according to the authors, this law “is not logical in
this context with respect to all its provisions”).
122. Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 821.
123. It should be noted, however, that constitutional courts remain sensitive to inequalities. See, e.g., Italy, supra note 51, at 436–38 (discussing Italian decisions involving blasphemy
or construction permits).
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countries where one religion dominates.124 These privileges manifest
themselves in different ways,125 including procedures for recognizing
and establishing churches, regulation of relations between particular
churches, religious teaching and education, direct and indirect financing or state support, and various other forms of state cooperation and assistance.
C. Differential Treatment of Religious Groups
Constitutional courts are charged with the responsibility to uphold or to invalidate provisions that in theory give differential treatment to churches and to determine the permissible scope of differential treatment between churches and religious groups. In making
these determinations it is important to distinguish between theory
and practice. For example, “the French system is the system of a
strict equality—in the legal meaning—of religions,” while in practice
“the legal equality is not matched by an actual equality.”126 This absence of actual equality impinges on legal equality and may be used
as a justification for legal differentiations. “The principle of equality
does not mean an absolute equality, it is relatively understood.. . .
The absolute equality could lead to an unequal treatment of religious
organizations.”127
Various European courts have expressed this same principle. The
German Constitutional Court stated in a 1965 opinion: “The Constitution does not require the State to treat equally religious communities in a schematic way.”128 Similarly, the Belgian Council of
State held in a 1996 case: “Religious equality does not mean that the
same regime must be applied to all religions.”129 The Austrian Constitutional Court in a 1972 decision stated: “Differentiation between
religious communities which are recognized by statute and other re124. For statistical data on Lichtenstein, see Wille, supra note 19, at 457, and for Portugal, see de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 554. See also Czech Republic, supra note 104, at
267; Slovenia, supra note 38, at 677.
125. See Italy, supra note 51, at 438 (providing examples in the realm of tax regulation in
that country).
126. Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 307.
127. Slovenia, supra note 38, at 702.
128. Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 345 (quoting a 1965 decision of the German Constitutional Court).
129. The original French states: “L’egalité des cultes n’implique pas que le même regime
soit appliqué à tout les cultes.” Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 179 (quoting a 1996 decision of the Belgium Council of State).
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ligions does not infringe the principle of equality.”130 Finally, “[t]he
legislature is not prohibited by anything to include the specificity of
religion and churches when establishing legal regulations implementing the fundamental right to the freedom of religion.”131
Thus, differentiation may be allowed provided that it is justified.
The justification for differentiation must be substantial. Because “the
general constitutional principle of equality also applies to churches
and religious organizations . . . the differentiation before law requires
a substantial justification which may be attributed to specific features
of a given church or religious organization.” It is defined as “the
parity in substantive law.”132 In Switzerland, the differentiation is
admitted: “the significance of main religions as regards their strength
and history, their public and charity tasks effected by national
churches.”133 The German Federal Constitutional Court indicated
that the premises of providing public and legal status to a given
church are “a conviction of the State that such churches are particularly effective when provided with the status of public institution,
that they enjoy a very important position in the society, and that
there is a guarantee of durability resulting from it.”134
Fundamental differentiation flows from a division between recognized churches and others churches and religious organizations.
In registration systems, churches and religious groups which fail to
become registered may even be deprived of the possibility to act.
And equality is not even assured for churches that do become registered. In this context, the German Constitutional Court emphasized:
it is forbidden to make a further differentiation inside religious
groups of recognized religious communities of public institution
status unless unequal treatment would be permissible under the
general principle of equality. The Federal Constitutional Court has
rejected the attempts to indicate tradition and history or religious
thesis as substantial justification for unequal treatment.135

130. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 124 (quoting a 1972 decision of the Austrian
Constitutional Court).
131. Adam, supra note 37, at 366.
132. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 124.
133. Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 821 (quoting decisions of the Swiss
Federal Court from 1917 and 1997).
134. Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 344.
135. Id.
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But at the same time, in Austria, certain privileges for the Catholic Church “may be to a large extent both justified by the fact that
we deal with the former state religion and approximately 78% of the
Austrian population is still in the Catholic church as well as by the
existing concordats with the Holy See.”136 The Italian Constitutional
Court, in reviewing penal sanctions for blasphemy, observed that the
argument of a number of church members may not justify the reference of contempt of religious feelings only to the Catholic religion as
the difference between the Catholic religion as the only state religion
and other religions recognized by the state is no longer valid in Italy.137
In conclusion, the limits of permitted differentiation are determined by the scope of the prohibition against discriminatory treatment. It is inappropriate, for instance, to grant unjustified privileges
to only one church, namely, to make its position more advantageous
in contrast not only to other churches but also to citizens generally.138 The differences in approach may not be significant enough to
prevent the existence of a given religious community, but each
community has to be guaranteed “a possibility of some form of legal
existence.”139 Thus, the regulations of the principle of equality may
not be transformed into the regulation of freedom to establish
churches and to exercise religion.140
V.

RELIGIOUS TEACHING AND THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM141

Religious teaching constitutes one of the fundamental elements
of religious freedom.142 Putting aside purely private religious instruction in church or at home, which in principle is beyond any state interference, religious teaching in the public sphere may not be viewed
separately from the regulations governing the educational system
136. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 124.
137. See Italy, supra note 51, at 427.
138. The Spanish Judgment of 1993 regarding the legislation on lease is an example of
this point.
139. The German Judgments. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10.
140. For an example of this, see the Turkish Judgment applicable to the Jehovah’s Witnesses and disqualifying the differentiation into “celestial” and “non-celestial” religions.
141. See XIIE TABLE RONDE INTERNATIONALE: L’ÉCOLE, LA RELIGION ET LA
CONSTITUTION, XII ANNUAIRE INTERNATIONAL DE JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE 125
(1996) [hereinafter L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION].
142. This principle is illustrated in Article 9 of the European Convention. See supra note
8 (reprinting Article 9).
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generally. There are two fundamental issues implicated here. First is
the issue of freedom to establish private schools that are affiliated
with particular churches or religious organizations. A subsidiary
question arises about the permissibility and the range of state support
for such schools and their students. But it should be remembered
that the role of private schools is defined primarily by the presence of
religious instruction in public schools143 and the scope of direct financial support of the state for churches and religion organizations.
Second is the issue of the permissibility and the scope of religious
teaching in public schools. A question arises as to how to relate particular churches with the operation of public school system. Both issues have been extensively addressed in the case law of constitutional
courts.
A.

Private Schools

1. Constitutional provisions relating to religiously-affiliated private
schools
Generally, the constitutional position of private schools is determined by freedom of instruction, which, in many countries, is clearly
guaranteed in the Constitution.144 The role of private schools is particularly emphasized in Germany: Article 7, Sections 4 and 5 of the
Grundgesetz describe private schools as “supplementing [the] public
school system.” Thus, the “guarantee for a private school as an institution” is appropriately provided for.145 In Italy, Article 33 of the

143. Only in France, secular public education is understood to mean the exclusion of
religious teaching.
144. See, e.g., SPAIN CONST. art. 27, § 3, in 17 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Spain
48–49 (providing generally for the freedom of teaching) (“The public authorities shall guarantee the right which will assist parents to have the children receive religious and moral formation
which is in keeping with their own convictions.”); ITALY CONST. art. 33, § 3, in 11
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Italy 54 (“Organizations and private citizens are entitled to
found schools and educational institutions which do not involve charges on the State.”); BELG.
CONST. art. 24, quoted supra note 63; POL. CONST. art. 70, § 3, in 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Poland 16 (“Parents have the right to choose schools other than public for
their children. Citizens and institutions have the right to establish primary and secondary
schools and institutions of higher education . . . .”). In France, freedom of instruction is considered one of the fundamental principles recognized by the Laws of the Republic. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 313.
145. Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 338–39 (citing a decision of the Federal
Constitutional Court referred therein.
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1947 Constitution guarantees the right to establish schools “without
encumbering the State.” The 1976 Constitution of Portugal at first,
characterized private schools as “supplementary education” (Article
75, Section 1). However, in the 1982 Amendment, private and public education were set on equal footing. Article 2 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights ensures freedom
of religious instruction, at least with respect to the teaching of religious and philosophical beliefs.146
Freedom of religious instruction is understood to mean the freedom to establish and operate private schools, the freedom to determine the content of the curriculum, and freedom of parents to
choose an appropriate school for their children.147 In particular, it is
the freedom to create a school with a character that may include “an
attachment to religious values.”148 Thus, this freedom includes “that
which concerns form as well as the content of education.”149
It follows that a private school may be affiliated with a specific religion. Indeed, it is very rare for religious organizations to be banned
from establishing private schools.150 In many countries, there is no
difference in the legal requirements for private religious schools as
opposed to schools with no religious character. However, sometimes
schools that are operated by or affiliated with religious entities are
granted privileges, namely granting rights of public school and state
financial support (e.g., Austria and Hungary). This is partially attributable to concordat provisions (e.g., Spain, Austria, Italy, and Portugal), but mostly to the more general constitutional context of religious freedoms. If the freedom of parents to choose a school is to be
real then not only religiously-affiliated schools must be able to exist
but the state has to treat them in a similar manner as public

146. See Wille, supra note 19, at 474 (citing a 1995 decision of the State Court).
147. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 892–93 (discussing a 1991 decision of the Constitutional Court).
148. Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 321.
149. Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 188 (citing a 1992 decision of the Cour
d’Arbitrage) (“ce qui concerne la forme que pour ce qui est du contenu d’enseignement.”).
150. See Turkey, supra note 25, at 847. In Macedonia “public and private schools are
secular, that is, religion neutral.” Macedonia, supra note 28, at 509.
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schools.151 Finally, only recognized or registered religions are generally allowed to run private schools.152
2. Limitations on the freedom of religious instruction
As with religious liberty generally, freedom of instruction is not
absolute. All countries have established state supervisory measures to
monitor the establishment and operation of private schools. Usually,
a state authorization is required to establish a school. However, it is
virtually impossible to refuse permission if a school fulfils the requirements provided for by law.153 State authorities are entitled to
request reports and information from schools and have the power to
lustrate the operation of the school. In sum, private schools fill a
substantial public mission and their operation is directly linked to the
public interest.154 However, supervisory regulations may not be so
extensive as to deprive a school of its private status and unique character.
Private school relations with the state if they seek analogous
status to public schools, in particular with regard to the recognition
of school diplomas and the right to obtain subsidies. The system of
contracts between public authorities and private schools is applied in
some countries (e.g., France and Spain) and other countries adopt a
system of granting private schools a status of public school (e.g.,
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, and Slovakia). Because it is
only when private schools receive equal status with public schools
that they will have a more lasting presence, in many countries one
may speak about the claim of private schools to be granted such
status. For example, in Austria, Concordat provisions provided for
the granting of public school status to all schools existing within the
framework of Catholic Church. This automatic application has been
extended to schools run by other recognized religions.

151. See, e.g., Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 314; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra
note 26, at 149; Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 185; Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10,
at 328. For Hungary it is indicated that the State “may not refuse a legal possibility of existence for schools which are based on or oriented towards religion or atheism.” Adam, supra
note 37, at 374.
152. See, e.g., Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 127.
153. For example, see Article 7, Section 4 of the German Constitution as well as the
Judgment of the Italian Corte Costituzionale of 1958.
154. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 792; Cerexhe & Boel, supra note
44, at 187.
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However, numerous obligations for private schools flow from receiving equal status with public schools, which in turn leads to the
abdication of some of their autonomy. This may be manifested in a
limited ability to select students,155 the duty to respect all students’
religious faiths,156 the duty to provide free education,157 or the obligation to accept teachers designated by public authorities.
3. The subsidization of private education
Subsidy by public authority of private education is one of the
most delicate issues in education. None of the countries discussed
herein have adopted the U.S. concept of a complete separation that
prohibits direct state financial support for religiously-affiliated
schools. Consequently, there is no constitutional ban against subsidizing private schools, regardless of their religious affiliation. In practice, many countries finance almost entirely the operation of private
schools (including personnel costs and schoolbooks) where the
schools have been granted the status of a public school or have entered into agreements with public authorities providing for this subsidy.
Notwithstanding this practice, it is unclear if subsidizing private
schools with public funds is merely allowed under the Constitution
or whether such subsidizing is constitutionally required. In Switzerland, it is accepted that there is no “claim” by private schools to public funds.158 In several countries, however, a requirement to subsidize
private schools has been interpreted as constitutionally required. The
rationale suggests that the equality principle requires state subsidy so
that parental choice for the education of their children in religiouslyaffiliated schools would not be inhibited.159

155. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 322; Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra
note 27, at 831.
156. See Adam, supra note 37, at 368; de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at
799.
157. See Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 189.
158. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 831; see also Wille, supra note 19, at
476 (discussing a 1996 decision of the State Court of Lichtenstein).
159. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 323 (discussing a 1977 decision of the
Conseil Constitutionnel). See also the 1993 decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court,
as well as the 1966 decision of the Federal Administrative Court and the 1987 of the Federal
Constitutional Court in Germany.
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The scope of the obligation to subsidize is also not uniform. For
example, the German Constitutional Court has stated
that the obligation to finance the replacement schools (Ersatzschulen) in need is only permitted if the financial standing of
such schools would be endangered without intervention of the
state or if the departure from the equality of public and private
schools would make it impossible to enjoy the freedom of education. Within such frameworks, the legislature is granted a vast discretion to determine the manner of meeting such obligations.160

In Belgium, granting subsidies is limited,
on the one hand, through the ability of the Community to tie the
subsidies to requirements of general interest, among others that of
quality education and of the standards of the school population
and, on the other hand, because of the need to distribute the available financial means among the many missions of the Community.161

The issue of subsidization also relates to the principle of equality,
both pertaining to the relationship between private and public
schools as well as to the relationship among private schools of various types. In Belgium, differentiation of churches and religious organizations is admitted under Article 24, Section 4 of the Constitution which requires “the consideration of objective differences.”162
Thus, as long as the criteria of proportionality and justification are
met, there will be no constitutional violation.163 According to German case law, the state may not treat replacement schools in a worse
manner than public schools simply because of their differences in
curriculum or methodology.164 In Italy, financing the transportation
of public school students has been upheld even where there is no
provision for the transportation of private school students. But no
reservations have surfaced in Italy as to the financing of schoolbooks
in both types of schools.165

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

75 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, at 67.
Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 188 (discussing a 1998 decision).
2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Belgium 4.
Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 189 (citing a 1992 decision).
See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 338.
See Italy, supra note 51, at 448.
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Questions of constitutionality may also arise if a private school
acquires a privileged position in regard to public schools.166 In Austria, the differentiation of the status of religiously-affiliated schools
and other private schools with public school status does not infringe
the principle of equality.167
4. The employment of teachers in religiously-affiliated private schools
Religiously-affiliated private schools may impose specific requirements with respect to its teachers. In principle, a private school
is free to create the criterion for selecting its teachers. However, if a
private school is granted public school status or enters into contracts
with public authorities, then the selection of teachers, to a large extent, is taken over by the state.
Generally speaking, employment at a private school does not deprive a teacher of constitutional rights, including the freedom of belief.168 Nevertheless, it is assumed that teachers have a duty to respect
the religious character of schools where they are employed. For example, the Constitutional Court of Spain indicated that a teacher’s
duty of respect does not force him to act as a defender of schoolsupported ideology, to transform his lessons into indoctrination, or
to subordinate scientific systems or truth to the school-supported
ideology. Nevertheless, teaching which is hostile or contradictory to
the ideology of a school may constitute grounds for dismissal. Dismissal may not be based solely on a teacher’s faith but must be related to specific actions.169 In Austria, a school may request to transfer a teacher170 if further employment of the teacher is not possible
for religious reasons.171 In Liechtenstein, teachers may be required to

166. See the 1994 decision of the French Conseil Constitutionnel, declaring unconstitutionality of legislation abolishing subvention limits in regard to private schools and subsequent
decisions of the Conseil d’État following the same direction. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra
note 14, at 324.
167. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26 at 146. This is similar for Hungary. See Adam,
supra note 37, at 376.
168. See the 1977 and 1985 decisions of the Conseil Constitutionnel. See BasdevantGaudemet, supra note 14, at 324.
169. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 802, and the decision referred to
therein.
170. In schools of public status, such decisions are made by public authorities.
171. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 150. This is similar to the Italian decision
of 1972 regarding the effects of withdrawal of the church authority approval for a professor of
Catholic university.

500

GAR-PP1.DOC

6/25/01 9:07 PM

467]

Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience

meet “ethical qualifications.”172 Finally, in Italy, evaluations of a
teacher’s disposition towards religion may be made, but the 1984
Amendment to the Concordat abolished the criterion of moral
evaluation.173
B.

Public School

1. The teaching of religion in public schools
The teaching of religion in public schools should be viewed with
the background and nature of the state in mind. State-religion neutrality exists in most of the countries discussed in this article. Thus,
public schools in such countries tend to be neutral rather than religious schools. However, just as state neutrality does not imply indifference174 or disregard for religion but rather guarantees “freedom of
religion in pluralistic system[s] of religions and cultures,”175 the notion of a neutral public school does not obligate a school to be
purely secular or require complete separation of religious teaching
from a school’s curriculum.
In Belgium, the 1994 Decree sets forth principles of neutrality.176
In Spain, the principle of neutral schools and the respect of religious
and moral ideas are considered fundamental. It means, in particular,
banning a school from imposing a specific faith or religion “with an
apologetic content or with the goal of indoctrination and not purely
for informational purposes.”177 In Portugal, the 1976 Constitution,
Article 43, Section 3 provides that “public education may not be of
religious character.” However, against the background of the state
not being agnostic, atheistic, or secular, this constitutional provision
does not prohibit cooperation between church and state.178

172. Wille, supra note 19, at 476.
173. See A. Pizzorusso, Italie, in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note 141, at 269
(1996).
174. See Adam, supra note 37, at 377 (discussing a 1996 decision of the Constitutional
Court).
175. Id. at 272.
176. See Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 189.
177. de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 804 (citing a 1991 decision of the
Constitutional Court) (“avec un contenu apologétique ou dans un but d’endoctrinement et
non purement informative.”).
178. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 589.
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Interpretations of state neutrality or laicité are not uniform in all
countries. In France, emphasis is placed on separation of public
school and religion; while “no religion is privileged, all are respected.”179 In Hungary, the Constitutional Court requires that
“neutral public school cannot be committed to any religion or
worldview; it must make free and well founded choices possible.”180
In many countries of Western Europe, neutrality does not necessarily exclude a direct link to the Christian tradition and value system. While the German Constitution has guaranteed the existence of
non-religious public schools, in the German Federal Republic, the
operation of public schools with Christian character is not prohibited
by Lander, even if a minority group does not want such religious influence. However, there are limits to the teaching of religion in public schools. While the teaching of religion in churches focuses on
specific religious precepts, public schools aim to pass on more general Christian values. Such schools are different from mission schools.
They must limit compulsory elements, be open to other religious
and philosophical ideas and values, and the upbringing aim of school
cannot be Christian and religion oriented, a significance should be
attached to the principle of tolerance.181
In Spain, according to the agreement between the state and
Holy See, the educational process in public schools must respect
Christian values and ethics.182 The Portuguese Concordat183 and the
1984 Amendment to the Italian Concordat include similar provisions.184 In Austria, the Act on Organization of Education states that
the objective of public schools is to help in the upbringing of youth
“in the spirit of customary, religious and social values as well as in
Truth, Good and Beauty.”185 In Liechtenstein, under the Landeskirche model, the Constitution provides that one of the main

179. Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 316.
180. Decision 4/1993. See G. BRUNNER & L. SOLYOM, VERFASSUNGSGERICHTS
BARKEIT IN UNGARN, BADEN-BADEN 421 (1995).
181. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 336 (discussing a 1975 decision of the
Federal Constitutional Court).
182. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 806.
183. A challenge to its constitutionality has been rejected by the Constitutional Court.
See L. Nunes de Almeida & R. Mendes, Portugal, in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note
141, at 308–13 [hereinafter Nunes de Almeida & Mendes].
184. See decision 203/1997 of the Corte Costituzionale.
185. Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 107.
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tasks of upbringing and education is religious and ethical formation.186
2. Neutrality allows for the teaching of religion in public schools
The principle of neutrality in many European countries is not
viewed as the obligation to separate public schools from Christian
values and traditions. Rather, it allows for the teaching of religion as
part of the comprehensive operation of public schools.
European countries have not followed the American model of
imposing constitutional bans on the teaching of religion in public
schools. Even in France, where secularism in school means that “religious instruction is not part of scholastic programs,” this prohibition refers to primary schools only, whereas in secondary schools, it
is possible to organize chaplaincies.187 Also, in Eastern European
states, where the principle of secular schools is emphasized, public
school buildings may be used for the teaching of religion outside the
regular school schedule as a supplement to the school curriculum.188
In many countries, the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires the organization of the teaching of religion in public schools.
In these countries, this area of lawmaking is left to the legislature.189
Constitutional courts have recognized that the introduction of religion in public schools does not infringe constitutional rights per se
but have also recognized that various requirements and specific guarantees must be met.190 Although the teaching of religion in public
schools does not violate constitutional provisions per se, parents and
students do not necessarily have the right to require such teaching.191
In other countries, the constitution requires the organization of
the teaching of religion in public schools. Article 7, Section 3 of the
186. See Wille, supra note 19, at 468.
187. Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 314 (“instruction religieuse ne fait pas partie de programmes scholaires”).
188. See Russia, supra note 27, at 657; Macedonia, supra note 28, at 508; Slovenia, supra
note 38, at 714.
189. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 139.
190. See the 1981 decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court, de Mendizabal Allende
et al., supra note 27, at 806; the decisions of the Portuguese Constitutional Commission and
Constitutional Court of 1982, 1987 and 1993, Nunes de Almeida & Mendes, supra note 183,
at 308–13; the 1991 decision of the Polish Constitutional Court, Leszek Lech Garlicki,
Pologne, in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note 141, at 287; and the 1997 decision of the
Romanian Constitutional Court, Romania, supra note 56, at 636.
191. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 829.
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German Constitution allows for the teaching of religion in all public
schools that are not specifically designated as non-religious schools.
In Belgium, Article 24, Section 1 of the constitution guarantees public school students the choice between studying a recognized religion
or non-religious ethics. In the Czech Republic, the teaching of religion in state schools is provided for by Article 16, Section 3 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms.192 In Poland, the
teaching of religion in public schools must be introduced at the request of parents.193 Countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Poland that may have a duty under Concordat provisions to introduce
the teaching of religion in public schools, may also have a duty, under principles of equality, to do so for all religions. The organization
of religious teaching in such countries is a constitutional task of the
state and other public authorities.194
In order to prevent public schools from becoming religious
schools, the teaching of religion in public schools may not be limited
to one religion. However, identical treatment and recognition of all
existing religions is not required.195 The teaching of religion in public schools may be limited to the teaching of recognized churches.
Another possibility may be to base the right to teach religious doctrine in public schools on the stage of development and degree of
the public approval of such doctrine.196
3. The teaching of religion as an integral part of the school curriculum
The teaching of religion may take place on school premises without a direct link to school curriculum, or it may constitute an inte-

192. Article 16, Section 3 states, “The law establishes the conditions of religious instruction at state schools.” 5 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Czech Republic 157.
193. Article 53, Section 4 of the 1997 Constitution provides, “The religion of a church
or other legally recognized religious organization may be taught in schools, but others peoples’
freedom of religion and conscience shall both be infringed thereby.” 15 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at Poland 12.
Already in the beginning of 1990s, case law has determined that the elimination of religion from public schools would be contradictory to the principle of individual freedom of religion, see Maczynski, supra note 53, at 538–39; a similar position was adopted by the Portuguese
Court in a 1987 decision, see Nunes de Almeida & Mendes, supra note 183, at 308–13.
194. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 338; Wille, supra note 19, at 469; Romania, supra note 56, at 635.
195. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 338.
196. See Adam, supra note 37, at 276 (discussing decision 6/1993 of the Constitutional
Court).
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gral part of the school process of teaching and upbringing. While the
former system exists in countries that emphasize the principle of
secular schools like Russia and Macedonia, the latter system exists in
the majority of countries discussed in this article.
In such countries, religion classes are treated as ordinary subjects.197 They are taught on equivalent terms as other classes,198 are
totally integrated in the school’s curriculum and schedule, and are
graded like other subjects. Religion teachers are members of the
educational staff, and public authorities bear the costs of their salaries
and social security. However, in each country, details regarding these
matters differ slightly.
States have set their own standards with regard to the curriculum
of religious classes. In Germany,199 religious lessons do not consist of
a neutral comparison of religious doctrines. Rather, the lessons must
teach specific beliefs of a given religious community. The given
church’s ideas on teaching are binding on the school. In Austria, the
teaching of religion in schools is considered an internal operation of
recognized churches and religious groups.200 A 1991 Polish Constitutional Court decision indicated that due to the principle of state
neutrality, the content of religious teaching should be determined by
church authority and not by the state.201
Just as various forms of cooperation and supervision between
churches and public authorities exist,202 various views on grades for
religion classes and their significance exist in different countries. In
some countries, grades for religion classes are not listed on school
report cards.203 In other countries, grades are listed but do not affect
graduation or further education,204 and in other countries, religion
grades are treated the same as grades for other subjects.205
197. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 337.
198. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 806; Italy, supra note 51, at 453.
199. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 327, 450 (discussing the case of Land of
Brandenburg).
200. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 140.
201. See G. BRUNNER & LESZEK LECH GARLICKI, VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN
POLEN, BADEN-BADEN 119 (1999).
202. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 806; Wille, supra note 19, at
469.
203. See Adam, supra note 37, at 376; Slovak Republic, supra note 45 at 673.
204. See de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra note 27, at 807; de Sousa e Brito, supra note
11, at 585.
205. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 142; Romania, supra note 56, at 636.
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The position and status of religion teachers may vary from country to country. For example, in Spain, religion teachers may not be
school headmasters because religion teachers are only employed on
one-year contracts. Generally, there are no objections to a clerical
person teaching in public schools.206 However, it is essential for appropriate church authorities to approve a teacher (missio canonica in
the Catholic Church).
Although the teaching of religion in public schools is obligatory,
attendance is optional and depends on the decision of parents and
students. The right to choose whether or not to participate in religious classes is an essential element of the principle of religious freedom.207 Here a question arises, among others, about the appropriate
form of declarations submitted: in Portugal and in Poland the Constitutional Courts have indicated that the Constitution guarantee the
“right to silence” as regards religious beliefs. Thus only “positive”
declarations are permissible, where the request to participate in religion classes is declared.208
The teaching of religion must take into account the principle of
religious pluralism. Thus, if public schools organize the teaching of
one religion, they must ensure comparable conditions for the teaching of other religions. However, as mentioned above, such guarantees of equality are usually limited to recognized or registered religions. Countries differ in the implementation of this principle,
especially in countries where one religion is dominant.209
The principle of religious pluralism also requires the protection
of non-believers or those who, for other reasons, do not fit the
school’s religious curriculum. The majority of countries provide alternative classes in ethics or moral formation for such students. In
Belgium, such lessons cannot defend any specific philosophical system or be inspired by militant secularism.210 However, in some countries, mandatory attendance at alternative classes is unconstitu-

206. See, e.g., Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 193; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26,
at 141; Czech Republic, supra note 104, at 277.
207. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 336; de Mendizabal Allende et al., supra
note 27, at 796; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 139; Italy, supra note 51, at 451; de
Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 585; Romania, supra note 56, at 636; Czech Republic, supra
note 104, at 276.
208. See Garlicki, supra note 190, at 288; de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 586.
209. See de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 584.
210. See Cerexhe & Boel, supra note 44, at 193.
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tional.211 In Belgium, students do not have to attend religion or ethics classes; in Switzerland, a release from Bible history classes may be
requested.212
VI. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE TEACHING OF RELIGION IN
PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Various problems may arise from the presence of religion in public schools. One such problem involves the placement of religious
symbols, like crosses and crucifixes, in classrooms or on school premises. In some countries this is not allowed.213 For example, in Germany and Switzerland, the constitutional courts banned the placement of crosses and crucifixes in public schools. The Swiss decision
of 1990 stated that the placement of religious symbols in public
schools violated the neutrality of religious teaching, which is constitutionally protected. The decision also referred to the state’s obligation to ensure religious peace.214 The German Court, in its 1995 decision, indicated that since the meaning of a cross could not be
reduced to a general symbol of Western culture, placing one in the
classroom or school would transgress the admissible religious and
world-view nature of schools. The Court further stated that since
students who did not believe in the crucifix would not be able to
avoid the presence of a cross placed in the classroom, such placement
would infringe upon their freedom of religion.215 However, in other
countries, no objections arise as to the placement of crosses in classrooms.216 In Austria, under the provisions of the Concordat, a cross
must be placed in the classroom if the majority of students are
Catholic.217

211. See Pizzorusso, supra note 173, at 272 (discussing Italian decision no. 203/1989).
212. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 829; see also Kucsko-Stadlmayer,
supra note 26, at 139.
213. See, e.g., Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 318; Adam, supra note 37, at 376;
Slovenia, supra note 38, at 714; Czech Republic, supra note 104, at 277; de Sousa e Brito, supra note 11, at 562 (noting that a similar situation exists in Spain).
214. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 817.
215. See Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 337.
216. Wille, supra note 19, at 473; Maczynski, supra note 53, at 547; Romania, supra
note 56, at 636.
217. See Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra note 26, at 174.
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School prayer may also pose problems.218 In some countries,
school prayer is not expressly allowed or prohibited.219 In other
countries, school prayer is allowed as long as participation is voluntary.220 According to the 1993 decision of the Polish Constitutional
Court, states would violate the prohibition on their right to interfere
in religious practices by denying students the opportunity to pray.221
Religious outfits of students and various religious symbols worn
by them have also caused problems. In particular, the Council of
State in France has dealt several times with the issue of Islamic girls
wearing head scarves. In 1989, the Council decided that although
wearing religious symbols is, as a principle, protected by the freedom
of religion, this freedom does not protect the ostentatious display of
religious symbols that would constitute acts of pressure, provocation,
proselytism, or propaganda and that could violate the dignity or
freedom of other students, endanger their health or safety, or obstruct an educational process or school order. This decision has been
applied in subsequent cases.222 In Belgium, as indicated by F.
Delperee, the wearing of head scarves is protected by the Constitution, but it may be banned if it is objectively justified (for instance,
with respect to physical education lessons or sports). Furthermore, a
broader limitation may apply to non-religious teachers since they
have a general duty to “exercise reserve” and not to impose, in any
way, their religious ideas or approach onto their students.223 Thus, a
teacher may be banned from wearing a head scarf 224 or a Buddhist
monk outfit and neck chain.225
Finally, the question of whether students have a right to be excused from certain lessons or school attendance based on their reli218. The Supreme Court of the United States has expressed its view on this matter multiple times.
219. See, e.g., Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 320; Adam, supra note 37, at 376;
Slovenia, supra note 38, at 714; Czech Republic, supra note 104, at 277.
220. See, e.g., Hoemig & Hassemer, supra note 10, at 336; Kucsko-Stadlmayer, supra
note 26, at 13; Romania, supra note 56, at 636; Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at
829; Wille, supra note 19, at 473.
221. See BRUNNER & GARLICKI, supra note 201, at 191–92.
222. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 319.
223. Isensee/Kirchhof: Handbuch des Staatsrechts der BRD, Bd. 6, Heidelberg 1989, at
360.
224. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 830 (discussing a 1997 decision of
the Swiss Bundesgericht).
225. See O. Jouanjan, Allemagne, in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note 141, at 164
(discussing a 1988 decision of the German Federal Administrative Court).
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gious beliefs has been raised. Islamic girls have been excused from
swimming lessons with boys without serious question.226 However,
more doubts have been raised with regard to permanent school absence on Saturdays or Fridays. In France, although the duty to attend school is considered fundamental and general excuses would infringe the appropriate operation of schools, individual excuses due to
religious holidays have been allowed.227 Similarly, the 1993 decision
of the Swiss Bundesgericht stated that while freedom of religion does
not exempt people from respecting civic duties, the principle of proportionality allows students to be excused from classes as long as the
organization and efficiency of teaching is not affected and the religious beliefs of other students are not infringed.228 In other countries, permanent absence from school on Saturdays due to religious
beliefs has been allowed.229

226. See Hungerbuehler & Feraud, supra note 27, at 830; see also Jouanjan, supra note
225, at 163 (discussing a 1993 decision of the German Federal Administrative Court ).
227. See Basdevant-Gaudemet, supra note 14, at 319.
228. See B. Knapp, Suisse, in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note 141, at 319–20.
229. See Jouanjan, supra note 225, at 163 (discussing a decision of the German Federal
Administrative Court concerning the Seventh-Day Adventists). For Austria, see O. Pfersmann,
Autriche in L’ÉCOLE ET LA RELIGION, supra note 141, at 174–75.
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